Wednesday, December 28, 2005

Sovereignty and Abstract Objects

You might recall a few weeks back I had a post on "Aseity and Abstract Objects" hinting at some of the problems that arise if we grant that (1) God has a nature--a property or group of properties that He has essentially and that are distinct from Him. and (2) God exists "a se"--God depends on nothing distinct from Himself for His existence. I had planned on a follow-up post looking at another facet on the problem of God and abstract objects, namely, the question of divine sovereignty. Imagine my delight when I found that Simon recently commented on the very subject, doing a far better job than I would have. Check out his post yourself. Let me just add my 2 cents however: Suppose we define Sovereignty thus: (3) Whatever is distinct from God depends on God for its existence How does this square with the Platonic thesis of necessarily existing abstract entities? After all, if such things are necessary (that is to say, their non-existence is impossible), how can they depend on God for their existence? It would seem, as Plantinga wonders, that their existence isn't "up to God." Moreover, consider the very character of such abstract entities. Take for example, the property omniscience. Its character is such that whatever entity, x, has it, for every true proposition p, x knows that p. But it does not seem that this characteristic of omniscience is "up to God." So then how should we understand divine sovereignty if it seems that the existence and character of abstract objects are not "up to God?"

Are you suffering from Theological Myopia?

Attention bloggers, Jonathan Moorhead has an excellent post on warning signs that you might be suffering from Theological Myopia. Symptoms include: (1) Your blog is named after a certain brand of theology. (2) Every post you produce relates to your pet theological system. (3) Anyone who disagrees with you is not saved. (4) Every book from your “Favorite Books” list is from the 20th century. (5) Your avatar names your pet theology. (6) Your sole purpose for reading books opposed to your theology is to pillage them for “heretical” statements.

Monday, December 26, 2005

Human Nature and the Incarnation

Speaking of the incarnation, Freddoso got me thinking again. It is generally acknowledged by Christians that the Son freely assumed a human nature--a nature hypostatically united to Himself. So it must be that case that He is contingently human. But what of this: Is it likewise true that Christ's human nature is contingently united to the divine person? Or put differently, is the following proposition true, (P) There a possible world W and a time t such that (i) Christ's human nature, N, exists at t in W and (ii) N is not united to a divine person. I think the question is deceptively complex.

Sunday, December 25, 2005

The Definition of Chalcedon

This being Christmas day, what better to post than this: "Following the holy Fathers we teach with one voice that the Son [of God] and our Lord Jesus Christ is to be confessed as one and the same [Person], that he is perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood, very God and very man, of a resonable soul and [human] body consisting, consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead, and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood; made in all things like unto us, sin only excepted; begotten of his Father before the worlds according to his Godhead; but in these last days for us men and for our salvation born [into the world] of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God according to his manhood. This one and the same Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son [of God] must be confessed to be in two natures, unconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly, inseparably [united], and that without the distinction of natures being taken away by such union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature being preserved and being united in one Person and subsistence, not separated or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten, God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, aas the Prophets of old time have spoken concerning him, and as the Lord Jesus Christ hath taught us, and as the Creed of the Fathers hath delivered to us."

Tuesday, December 20, 2005

Necessity and Divine Simplicity

Johny-Dee provides an interesting criticism of the doctrine of Divine Simplicity here and here at Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Check it out.

Thursday, December 15, 2005

Aquinas On Angelic Cognition

While reading Freddoso on angels, I was reminded of Bultmann’s comment that “it is impossible to use electrical light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles.” By “impossible” Bultmann does not mean (I think) that it just is not epistemically possible to hold to be true the phenomena of miracles and to avail ourselves of modern technology. Rather, his point, I suspect, is that the modern age with all its marvelous advances has changed the way we see the world. We have “grown up,” he might say, having abandoned our medieval superstitions about angels and demons. Yet for those of us who use “electrical light and the wireless” but are not embarrassed by notion of angelic beings, Freddoso reminds us what a rich and fascinating resource Aquinas is. Commenting on what it is like to be an angel Freddoso says:
…even though you do not get your knowledge through sensation, you suddenly realize, upon closer in(tro)spection, that you’re really quite the expert in mathematics and natural science, without ever having taken any courses and without having devised any long proofs or carried out any experiments. In fact, your grasp of nature is as thorough as it was painless to acquire. You came by it naturally, as they say; you’ve had it ever since you popped into existence or, more accurately, ever since you were brought into existence.
What does he mean here? Just what do angels know, and how do they know it? Aquinas takes up the question in the Summa I. QQ 54-58. Now Aquinas readily follows Aristotle positing that although knowledge begins with sensory experience, there is more to knowing a thing that simply “seeing” it. Knowledge comes as we engage in the process of abstraction, the mental act of ‘stripping away’ all the inessential qualities of a thing. This is because the form (the ‘whatness’) of the particular must be grasped for there to be true knowledge. The rational mind comes to know particulars when it abstracts the form or the ‘intelligible species’ from that particular. What is left in the mind of the knower is simply the intelligible species of that thing, for the form of the particular must be in the mind of the knower for the thing to be known. It would seem then that angels, like humans, come to knowledge when they abstract the universal from some particular object so that the form of that object comes to reside in them. Aquinas himself raises the point:
It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things (I. Q.55. art.2).
The form of some individual is in the mind of a knower either as an exemplar (and therefore a [formal] cause of what is known) or as an image having been abstracted from the individual. Since the forms are not in the angel as an exemplar (i.e. it is not causal) as in case of God, then the forms must be acquired through abstraction. But Aquinas says this in fact is not the case:
An angel does not cognize individuals through an acquired form at all, because it does not cognize [anything] through a form it gets from a thing; for [if it did, then] in that case things would act on its intellect, which is impossible. Nor does it cognize [an individual] through some form newly infused by God, newly revealing something to the angel. For the forms an angel has in it, which were created along with it, are sufficient [for it] to cognize everything cognizable [by it] (Quaestiones Quodlibeales 7.1.3 ad 1).
Unlike a human being who comes to know an individual, say a book, by abstracting the universal or form from the book (the book having acted on his senses), an angel comes to knowledge of the same in virtue of the intelligible forms already in the angel from the time of its creation. So then, an angel can be said to know an individual not through that individual’s form, but through itself! An angel then, like Freddoso says, actually knows what it knows through introspection. Here is another matter to consider. Angelic cognition (in virtue of the very nature of such beings) is far more excellent than that of human beings. Eleonore Stump presses the point:
…like God and unlike human beings, angels are absolutely immaterial knowers. For that reason, angelic cognition, like divine cognition, is entirely intellective, surpassing human intellective cognition in the degree of universality and the fewness of the intelligible forms it needs in order to cognize things. (Stump, Aquinas).
She quotes Aquinas:
God understands all things through his one essence. But the higher intellective substances, although they do understand through more than one form, [in comparison with lower intellective substances] they understand through fewer and more universal forms, more powerful for comprehending things, because of the efficacy of the intellective power that is in them. In the lower [intellective substances], however, there are more forms, which are less universal and less efficacious for comprehending things, to which [these lower substances] fall short of the intellective power of the higher ones (Summa I. Q. 89).
A human being, say Socrates, in knowing any individual thing, must acquire the intelligible species of that thing in order to know it. So then for any object x, Socrates knows x only if Socrates has abstracted the form of x. But think of the multitude of objects that Socrates knows: rocks, rivers, hair, cats, dogs, houses, etc. Socrates knows each of these individuals only when he abstracts the forms of each. So Socrates knows a multitude of objects by means of multitudes of universals—rockness, riverness, hairness, catness, dogness, and so on. But Aquinas thinks that an intellectual substance, say, the angel Gabriel, has more excellent knowledge for he is able to know a multitude of things through fewer, higher universals, “more powerful for comprehending things.” And such forms are of course already built into Gabriel’s nature, having been instilled there at his creation. Stump provides us an analogy: A little boy is able to cognize his mother’s disposable coffee cup by applying to it the universal, cup. But a person of greater knowledge, say a chemist who knows the nature of Styrofoam or a physicist who has a firm grasp of the basic properties of matter, is able to have a deeper and fuller knowledge of the same cup. They of course know this disposable cup by means of the universal cup, but this universal is subsumed under other universals, which are in turn subsumed under other universals until we come to the highest universal available to the chemist or the physicist.

Tuesday, December 13, 2005

Philosophy of Religion Site

I stumbled across this Philosophy of Religion site by pure accident. This guy is a friend of Keith and I and he heads up a philosophy discussion group that we attend.

Thursday, December 08, 2005

Dembski On Plantinga On "Fundamentalism"

Plantinga just has a way with words. See his brief treatise on Fundamentalism.

Sunday, December 04, 2005

Aseity and Abstract Objects

A good number of philosophers since Plato have thought that reality is not only comprised of corporeal and sensible objects, but that alongside the physical universe, there exists an invisible realm of abstract entities like properties, numbers, propositions, sets, and the like. Among other things, Platonism, seems to provide a unified account of predication so that for something like 1) Socrates is white, there is a subject, “Socrates,” and a real abstract entity, the property “whiteness,” distinct from and exemplified by Socrates. A subject has its properties either essentially or accidentally. The essential properties of a subject are called its essence or nature. Now theists have long confessed that a Perfect Being must be completely self-sufficient and depend upon nothing for its existence. This notion is often expressed in the statement, ‘God exists a se,’ that is, of Himself. Hence the aseity thesis: 2) Necessarily, God depends on nothing distinct from Himself for His existence. A problem seems to arise, however, when we think of God and abstract objects. If God has a nature, then how should we understand His properties? Take the property omniscience which God has essentially, how should we understand God’s relationship to this entity? Plantinga wonders,
If that property didn’t exist, then God wouldn’t have it, in which case he wouldn’t be omniscient. So the existence of omniscience is a necessary condition of God’s being the way he is; in this sense he seems to be dependent upon it (Plantinga, Does God Have A Nature?).
God it seems, must exist in an asymmetrical relation of dependency on His properties for while say, the property omniscience is a necessary condition for His existence, it does not seem that His existence is a necessary condition for the existence of omniscience. But what of the aseity thesis? If God is dependent on the property omniscience, then it seems that He does not exist a se after all. Should theists then reject the aseity thesis?

Saturday, December 03, 2005

Boethian Eternalism, Fatalism, and Future Contingents

OK, sorry I've been absent so long everyone. I was under the weather for a while and so was my wife so I just decided to take a break. Anyway, I promised Attilla that I would give the eternalist response to the problem of foreknowledge and fatalism. Here goes.
Here is how I think it might go. I will sketch the fatalism argument according to Linda Zagzebski as it makes clear some key assumptions (the Principle of the Necessity of the Past, the Transfer of Necessity Principle) in fatalist arguments. Let B = You will answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am. 1) Yesterday, God infallibly believed B (supposition of infallible knowledge) 2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then (Principle of the necessity of the past). 3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed B (from 1, 2) 4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed B, then B (definition of “infallibility”). 5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary (Transfer of Necessity Principle). 6) So it is now-necessary that B (3,4,5) 7) If it is now-necessary that B, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am (Definition of "necessary"). 8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am (6, 7) 9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely (Principle of Alternate Possibilities). 10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am, you will not do it freely (8, 9, modus ponens). The Molinist response (see previous post) does not deny any of the premises in this argument. It simply argues that God’s knowledge is such that if B God would infallibly know that B and if –B, then God would have infallibly known –B. The eternalist however explicitly denies 1). It does not deny that God infallibly believes B, rather it denies that Yesterday, God infallibly believes B. God exists timelessly, and since God does not exist at any time, then He does not hold His beliefs at any time. As God does not exist temporally before events, He does not have fore-knowledge of events, rather God’s knowledge is such that He apprehends in a single complete and infallible grasp, all events in the entire span of time. God’s knowledge of my answering the phone at 9am then does not make my answering the phone at 9am any more necessary than my seeing Socrates sitting makes Socrates’ sitting necessary. If our cognizance of present things does not make those things necessary, why should it be thought that God’s cognizance of things eternally present to Him makes them necessary?