SUMMA PHILOSOPHIAE

Summa Philosophiae Has Moved!!!

2006-07-05T20:08:00.000-05:00

We have now joined the Wordpress community. You can find our new and improved Summa Philosophiae over here. Edit your bookmarks accordingly. Thanks to those of you who continually support us.

Intellectual Myopia: THE killer plague

2006-06-30T16:48:00.000-05:00

Many are familiar with the Bubonic plague which devastated and claimed countless lives in the Middle Ages. What we are not as familiar with is a plague of a different sort. It is one that has crippled and destroyed an equal amount of lives, perhaps even more than the Bubonic plague, though in a different sense. It is the plague of Intellectual Myopia. Myopia can be defined as: -my⋅o⋅pi⋅a n 1 : a condition in which the visual images come to a focus in front of the retina of the eye resulting especially in defective vision of distant objects 2 : a lack of foresight or discernment : a narrow view of something - my·o·pic /-'O-pik, -'ä-/ adjective - my·o·pi·cal·ly /-pi-k(&-)lE/ adverb Let us focus on the latter of these two descriptions. Therefore, the symptoms of intellectual myopia consist of: 1) a failure to think critically (understanding the implication of one’s beliefs and to engage in healthy scrutinizing) 2) a lack of desire towards intellectual exposure (More symptoms could be listed, but for now these will do. Feel free to add to the list of symptoms.) Now it seems that nobody is exempt from this plague in some sense. Despite my best efforts there are times when I act on or accept a certain belief that I have not considered in a critical manner. We commonly accept beliefs without clearly thinking through their logical implications. A mind, like a muscle, is something to be trained, worked out and stretched. Whether this is done in a routine fashion or a random fashion, it needs to be done with diligence. One means to this end would be the intentional exposure to new ideas on a regular basis (heaven forbid). Unfortunately, this plague has infiltrated the Church in large measure. Take for instance the literature that abounds in Religious bookstores. George Barna “noted that the religious books of greatest influence in the past several years have not addressed people’s fundamental theological views. ‘Most of the bestsellers have focused on meaning, purpose, security and the end times,’ the researcher pointed out. ‘While there have been theological views expressed in those books, very few popular books have helped people to think clearly and comprehensively about their core theology. Consequently, most born again Christians hold a confusing and inherently contradictory set of religious beliefs that go unchecked by the leaders and teachers of their faith community.’” If it is the case that the religious community is not suffering from Intellectual myopia, then why does it seem that there are so few who have been administered the proper vaccination?

The Books the Church Suppressed

2006-06-30T11:18:00.000-05:00

The Books the Church Suppressed: Fiction and Truth in The Da Vinci Code. By Dr. Michael Green. Oxford, UK and Grand Rapids, MI: Monarch Books, 2005; 192 pages. No doubt we’ve all seen the film version of Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code, and (hopefully) most Christians have familiarized themselves with the novel itself. Whether either of these is true or not, we have all, knowingly or unknowingly, encountered some form of the claims contained therein. Dr. Michael Green, prolific writer and currently Canon Missioner of Holy Trinity Church (Raleigh, NC), has ably and accessibly responded to these claims. In the first of fourteen chapters, Green identifies the novel’s main assumptions against Christianity (e.g., that Jesus was not considered divine until 325 AD, when the Council of Nicaea —by vote—pronounced him so). Such views, springing largely from Gnostic texts such as The Gospel of Thomas, clearly contradict the testimony of the four NT Gospels. So, “Why our four Gospels and no others” (p. 17)? Chapter two is concerned with explaining where the idea of a canon of sacred books came from. As Dr. Green observes, it is “important to understand… that nobody decided, ‘Let’s have a new list of authoritative books.’” After establishing that the Jews regarded the OT as an inspired, authoritative canon long before Jesus’ day, Green describes the principle by which additional texts came to be accepted: Jesus’ followers were convinced of his deity (p. 22f). The third chapter is a brief analysis of the reliability of the NT texts, focusing especially on the Gospels. Their genre, authorship, dates, testimony, and manuscript data are considered. Chapters four through seven return to the formation of the NT canon. Green first tackles Jesus’ authoritative view of the OT (p. 41f), and then examines the authority (Hebrew shaliach) and subsequent impact of the Apostles. Chapter five discusses the collection and recognition of specific NT manuscripts. Green demonstrates his thorough familiarity with the history of various fixed collections of texts, and argues that “by and large the NT canon was recognised early in the second century…” Chapter six begins by noting two key tendencies of 2nd century churchmen: A function of inclusion in the canon, and a function of exclusion (p. 71f). Remember, the official list is largely established, but “the edges of the collection are somewhat blurred.” Green traces the gradual recognition by the early church of the 27 books comprising the NT from among the surplus of Gnostic and other books. Chapter seven identifies the main principles used to determine a book’s acceptance (or rejection) into the canon: apostolicity, orthodoxy, and catholicity. Perhaps the most important point thus far is that no individual or council announced the canon, it was, rather, recognized. Switching gears slightly, Green moves in chapter eight to examine the Gnostics. “[They] appeared as a movement within broadly Christian parameters, and [were] a perversion of the Christian faith in the direction of speculative theology. It is really weird stuff” (p. 93). After providing several samples of Gnostic writing, Green summarizes the Gnostic’s beliefs, which segues right to chapter nine. The Nag Hammadi library (the discovery story of which opens the chapter) contains many non-canonical books, the most controversial being the infamous Gospel of Thomas. Green astutely evaluates this and several other Gnostic texts, all of which deny an orthodox Christology. As Green observes, these texts have influenced more than mere novelists; they have affected contemporary scholarship as well (p. 117f). Chapter ten is a more in depth examination of Gnosticism. While laying out their beliefs, Green carefully explains the apostolic response to Gnosticism. Obviously, the movement was not stamped out (it surrounds us today). The sub-apostolic response is reviewed, and the chapter ends with a helpful breakdown of precisely “what’s wrong with Gnosticism” (p. 136). Chapter eleven is incidental to the book; it offers a brief survey of various other books rejected by the Church. The twelfth chapter is entitled, “Why does all this matter?” In response, Green identifies four reasons: for integrity, for society, for the church, and for the individual. In the course of elaborating on each of these, Green perceptively addresses many related attacks on orthodoxy (e.g., claims by Elaine Pagels, Karen King, the Jesus Seminar, et. al.). Included as well is a helpful chart laying modern Gnosticism alongside orthodox Christianity. There can be no doubt that these matter a great deal. In chapter thirteen Green takes on the “sacred feminine” motif of The Da Vinci Code (and its various manifestations in contemporary thought). The final chapter is a terrific recap of an insightful and widely accessible work. The sort of worldview that Brown (and so many others) embraces has been exposed for what it is: empty, and based on errors. Following the final chapter is a useful glossary and a short bibliography, for those interested in further study.

Hick's Ineffability Argument

2006-06-29T12:24:00.000-05:00

I have been inspired by Xavier to post some stuff on John Hick that I haven't thought about in a while. Here is Hick's argument for the ineffability of God on which I spoke to a youth group one time. 1) God’s being transcends the categories of human thought. 2) Any being which transcends the categories of human thought cannot be accurately described. 3) Therefore, any description of God will be inaccurate. Is this a good argument? Premise 2 seems unproblematic and true. Premise 1 has at least 2 problems: a. Self-defeating—one cannot know that God transcends the categories of human thought without knowing something about God that doesn’t transcend the category of human thought……… b. If it is true then it is false. But are there any more problems? a. Hick adopts a Hindu conception of God—that God is beyond any human conception. He is neither personal or impersonal, good nor evil. “Theologically, the Hindu distinction b/t Nirguna Brahman and Saguna Brahman is important and should be adopted into western religious thought” (Hick, “Religious Pluralism and Ultimate Reality,” 513). 1. The problem here, of course, is that no religion is supposed to be more valid than another, but Hick has elevated Hinduism to being closer to the truth!!! 2. If he is elevating this view of Ultimate Reality is he then excluding other different or contradictory views? I hope this spurs some good dialogue. Please share your thoughts, whether positive or negative.

Hick On the Nature of the Real

2006-06-26T22:42:00.000-05:00

A while back I had a post on John Hick's religious pluralism. According to Hick, all the major religions are in ‘contact’ with the same divine reality. The differing religious traditions are simply mankinds historically and culturally conditioned responses to this ultimate Reality. Thus, "…we always perceive the transcendent through the lens of a particular religious culture with its distinctive set of concepts, myths, historical exemplars and devotional or meditational techniques." Taking Immanuel Kant's epistemological distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon, Hick affirms a distinction between the Real in itself and the Real as it is percieved. The Real is never the direct object of experience. Rather, the Real is the "divine noumenon" that is experienced within the various religious traditions as the range of 'divine phenomena. That is, the Real in itself is never what is perceived. What is perceived is its cultural and historical manifestations. These manifestations can be personal, like Yahweh, Allah, Krishna etc.; or impersonal, like Brahman, Nirvana, etc. But there is a certain ambiguity in Hick's discussion of the Real and how it relates to its various manifestations (its personae and impersonae) that his reader will find quite frustrating, and serves (I think) to undermine his view. How exactly should we understand the nature of the Real and its manifestations? Could Hick be a polytheist, for instance? When George Mavrodes charged him with polytheism, Hick insisted that he was nothing of the sort. Upon reading Hick's Interpretation of Religion Mavrodes had suggested that Hick believed the various manifestations of the Real had real objective existence so that Allah, Jehovah, Brahman, Nirvana, Krishna etc. all somehow existed in some metaphysical realm simultaneously. But Hick contended that this was not precisely what he meant and that he was "at one level a poly-something, though not precisely a poly-theist, and at another level a mono-something, though not precisely a mono-theist." But what does that mean? Mavrodes points out that in Kant's system the noumenon as well as the phenomenon have real existence. That is, for Kant, the “thing in itself” has real objective existence, and so is the thing as it is experienced or perceived. But Hick seems to want to have it both ways. For on the one hand, he wants to employ Kant's epistemological distinction, but then he cannot accept the metaphysics that it implies.

Aquinas on the Essence of Composite Substances

2006-06-25T23:32:00.000-05:00

Just when I think I'm getting a basic grasp on Aquinas I have to stop and rethink what I had once supposed to be true of his views. I finally picked up his Being and Essence where he comments:

Form and matter are found in composite substances, as for example soul and body in man. But it cannot be said that either one of these alone is called the essence. That the matter alone of a thing is not its essence is evident, for through its essence a thing is knowable and fixed in its species and genus. But matter is not a principle of knowledge, and a thing is not placed in a genus or species through it but through that by which a thing is actual.

And he continues:

Neither can the form alone of a composite substance be called its essence, though some want to assert this. It is evident from what has been said that the essence is what is signified through the definition of a thing. Now the definition of natural substances includes not only form but also matter...It is evident, therefore, that essence embraces both matter and form.

I found this illuminating. I had previously labored under the mistaken impression that Aquinas identifed the essence of a composite substance with its form, since the form is that by which a thing is what it is. But this, evidently, is not the case.

William Craig / Bart Ehrman Debate Jesus' Resurrection

2006-06-06T08:53:00.000-05:00

Here is the transcript of the debate. This material will probably remain unpublished, so if you missed the debate this is your only access. Enjoy and be blessed!

Do we communicate effectively?

2006-05-31T19:12:00.000-05:00

(This post is for those of you that watched the video from the previous post.) In his book, Escape from Reason, Francis Schaeffer elucidates a critical problem with the methodology of our communication. He states: “Every generation of Christians has this problem of learning how to speak meaningfully to its own age. It cannot be solved without an understanding of the changing existential situation which it faces. If we are to communicate the Christian faith effectively, therefore, we must know and understand the thought-forms of our own generation.” Initially, his phrase “thought-forms” was an alien term to myself, being removed a few generations from Schaeffer himself. However, upon reading the book and considering his assertion, his idea that the need for effective communication is as relevant today as it was in times past. Philosophers are especially notorious for using their own special lingo. While being careful to not submit the idea that we dumb down our terminology, we must seek to effectively engage and meet people where they are at…terminologically speaking. It is one thing to know something, but it is quite another thing to be able to effectively communicate it cross-culturally and cross-generationally. May we as the bearers of the Truth seek to be effective in our communication efforts!

Real Christians of Genius...

2006-05-31T09:39:00.000-05:00

For those of you who are humored by the Budweiser "Real Men of Genius" commercials, you must check this out. It is pretty funny. Go here to see this delightful video! Oh, and feel free to share your thoughts about this video.

Simplicity and God's Abstract Names

2006-05-16T22:32:00.000-05:00

One of the striking implications of divine simplicity is that we can refer to God with abstract "names". That is, when we predicate something of God, that predication can be made absolutely if it pertains to any of God's essential attribures. Anselm, for example, is not afraid to identify God with the abstract notion of justice itself. So he says in Monologion 16:

It would seem, then, that the supremely good substance is called ‘just’ by its participating in a quality (in this case, justice), rather than through itself. But this is contrary to the already ascertained truth. The supreme nature is what it is—good, great, existing—precisely through itself and nothing else. So then, it is just through justice and it is just through itself. And if so, then what is more necessarily and clearly the case than that the supreme nature is justice itself? . . . And so if you ask what is this supreme nature we are talking about?’, you may answer ‘justice.’ What could be truer?

Anselm frequently makes these sorts of moves in the Monologion. So he says (1) Whatever is just is just through the form Justice (2) God is whatever He is through Himself (3) God is just These three propositions seems to lead to the conclusion (4) So God is Justice. He further states, that “since the supreme nature is strictly said not to possess, but to be justice, when it is said to be just strictly it is intelligibly thought of as ‘being justice’ and not as ‘possessing justice.’” For Anselm then, God is more like justice than He is a just thing. God does not possess justice like creatures do. Rather He exists as justice itself. Anselm wouldn’t be unhappy, then, to abandon all talk of God as being ‘good,’ ‘wise,’ ‘just,’ and the like, and speak of God instead with abstract names like goodness, wisdom, and justice. Aquinas, though with more temperate expression, is likewise willing to affirm that a simple God bears a certian resemblance to abstracta so much so that we can use abstract names when we speak of Him. He says in the Summa Ia 13.2:

Whereas names given to signify simple forms signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection.

That God can be spoken of with both concrete and abstract “names” suggests that, though He is a concrete being, there is a sense in which He is at least like an abstract entity such as an attribute. Leftow sums this up nicely: “For Thomas, ‘whiteness,’ an abstract name, signifies not something that exists independently, an Aristotelian substance, but an attribute, by having which a substance is white. Thomas insists that because He is simple, we at times must, e.g., call God not just good but goodness, giving Him an abstract ‘name’ appropriate to an attribute. Evidently, Thomas thinks that God’s simplicity renders Him significantly attribute-like.”

Darrell Bock Da Vinci Debate Tonight

2006-05-15T17:47:00.000-05:00

For those of you interested, Darrell Bock, research professor of New Testament Studies at Dallas Seminary will be having a debate on the Da Vinci code tonight that will be broadcast live via the web at 7:00pm Eastern Standard Time. Simply click here.

Kings and Simpletons

2006-05-10T00:05:00.000-05:00

"As the kings of the earth and the mighty of the earth are born in exactly the same way, physically, as the simplest man, so the most intellectual person must become a Christian in exactly the same way as the simplest person. This is true for all men everywhere, through all space and time. There are no exceptions. Jesus said a totally exclusive word: 'No man cometh unto the Father, but by me'" (John 14:6). -Francis Schaeffer, True Spirituality What are your thoughts about this statement?

Truth & Truth-Makers

2006-05-06T15:05:00.000-05:00

Bill Vallicella has a short but thought provoking post up entitled Veritas Sequitur Esse and the Truthmaker Principle. You should check it out.

Philosophy Action Figures...

2006-05-05T23:19:00.000-05:00

All right all of you philosophers out there. Now there exists philosophy dolls, I am sorry, philosophy action figures that you can give to your children for hours of fun. Or you can play with them yourself. Really, what sounds better than a Bashin Bishop Berkeley or Plunderous Plato. Of course there is my personal favorite...Angry Anselm-made for play than which none greater can be conceived. His motto: "Faith seeking to beat understanding into its enemies!" Seriously check out this website. It is so divine in its beauty that I am beginning to wonder if it is the result of a miraculous intervention on God's behalf! See here!

Truth Matters

2006-05-05T13:59:00.000-05:00

"The problem with postmoderns is that they have made peace with a poisonous view of truth, an untrue view of truth. It is one kind of problem to believe an untruth, to take as fact something that in reality is a falsehood, yet still believe that truth exists and can be known.... However, it is another kind of problem to believe that truth itself is merely a matter of personal belief and social custom, so that the truth about Jesus depends on who you take him to be; in this case, no amount of evidence or argument about particular matters of fact will change one's belief." --Doug Groothuis, Truth Decay, 24.

Are Women Reliable?

2006-04-29T01:39:00.000-05:00

When we come to Luke 24 we find an interesting bit of insight into the historical veracity of the empty tomb account. Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Mary the mother of James, and some other women present told the apostles of the things which they had just seen (i.e. the vacant tomb, the absent body, the two men, etc.). However, the apostles did not accept what they had to say concerning these things. But why not? Well, it seems that it is because the testimony of women was not held in high regard in their culture. Are there any extra-biblical sources that attest to this? Sooner let the words of the Law be burnt than delivered to women. (Talmud, Sotah 19a) The world cannot exist without males and without females-happy is he whose children are males, and woe to him whose children are females. (Talmud, Kiddushin 82b) But let not the testimony of women be admitted, on account of the levity and boldness of their sex, nor let servants be admitted to give testimony on account of the ignobility of their soul; since it is probable that they may not speak truth, either out of hope of gain, or fear of punishment. (Josephus, Antiquities 4.8.15) Any evidence which a woman [gives] is not valid (to offer), also they are not valid to offer. This is the equivalent to saying that one who is Rabbinically accounted a robber is qualified to give the same evidence as a woman. (Talmud, Rosh Hashannah 1.8) So Clint, what is the big point? Well, I am glad you asked! If the disciples were trying to create a resurrection account why would they use women as the primary witnesses? After all, women are the primary witnesses in all four gospels as opposed to men in only two gospels. Further, if legend creeps in over time, why was the text not redacted to show that men, a more reliable source, were in fact the first and primary witnesses to the empty tomb? Why even include the women at all? The scholar Gary Habermas found that about 75% of all critical and skeptical scholars accept the fact of the empty tomb (see The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus). However, there are those who refuse to let the evidence convince them. Their reasons? William Wand, former Oxford Church Historian addresses this matter in a concise manner stating that “all the strictly historical evidence we have is in favor of [the empty tomb], and those who reject it ought to recognize that they do so on some other ground than that of scientific history.”

N. T. Wright

2006-04-25T21:50:00.000-05:00

For those of you who enjoy reading this old chaps works, you should check out his newest work Simply Christian. From what I have heard it is going to be the Mere Christianity of this generation.

Jon Kvanvig to Join Baylor Faculty

2006-04-21T12:55:00.000-05:00

Thanks to Matt Mullins' post at Prosblogion it looks like Jonathan Kvanvig will be joining the philosophy department at Baylor University as a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. I raise my glass.

Stupid Reasoning and Beckwith's Tenure Denial

2006-04-17T10:00:00.000-05:00

MikeGene at Telic Thoughts has posted a response to one example of stupid reasoning regarding Beckwith's tenure denail. Update: scordova at Uncommon Descent has discovered MikeGene's post as well. See here. Update 2: MikeGene is all over it. See here.

I Sometimes Wonder...

2006-04-16T22:36:00.000-05:00

...Are the three major branches of Christianity--Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant--meant to tell us anything about the three divine Persons: the Father, the Son and the Spirit?

Presentism and Truthmakers

2006-04-15T22:11:00.000-05:00

According to Presentism, whatever exists, exists now, in the present. The past has flowed away and the future is yet to come. Only the present exits. But what of things like abstract objects? This view appears to rule out in one swift stroke, any view of abstract entities, for such things do not exists at times, present, past, or future. Many presentists would want qualify a bit. According to this qualified view, for any x, x exists if and only if x obtains in the present, and x is non-abstract. This way room is made for the existence of atemporal objects—objects like properties or numbers which exist but do not exist in the present since they do not exist at any time. But as attractive Presentism is, it faces a serious objection: How exactly are truths about the past grounded? This question of the grounding past truths is a consequence of the truthmaker thesis: TM: Every truth has a truthmaker—that in virtue of which a proposition or sentence is true. Traditionally, facts or states of affairs are taken to be the sort of things that qualify as truthmakers, so that for any true proposition P, there exists a corresponding fact or state of affairs S such that P if and only if S. But perhaps this definition is too strong. There are some truths, e.g. analytic ones, which seem to require no truthmakers. For example the proposition 1) All bachelors in are unmarried, is just true by definition. Similarly, contingent negative existential propositions like 2) Cerberus does not exist, are also thought to not require truthmakers since they do not posit the existence of anything and, so, do not require the existence of anything in order to be true. But save for the likes of 1) or 2), truthmakers are apparently needed for all other propositions. If it is true that I am now writing this post, then necessarily, it is the case that I am now writing this post. But what about the post I wrote last Saturday? What is it that grounds a proposition like: 3) Xavier wrote a post last Saturday. Given Presentism, apparently, nothing in the past could, since past events do not exist. Further, nothing in the present does either, for my typing last Saturday’s post occurred last Saturday. How then does Presentism account for the truth of something like 3)?

New Contributor

2006-04-11T22:34:00.000-05:00

I'd like to hoist a pint in welcoming our newest contributor, Matt Woodard. Matt is currently completing his Master's in Theology, while (rightly) promoting disinterest in anything Duke related. His specializations and interests include Scriptural background studies, textual issues, historical Jesus, NT exegesis, theology and so forth. We're excited to have Matt as part of our team, and I trust you will not be disappointed by anything he writes.

Exposing a Presupposition

2006-04-08T17:46:00.000-05:00

While engaged in a discussion of middle-knowledge with a dear friend recently, I noticed a presupposition. The objection was something in the neighborhood of this: "Middle-knowledge sounds nice philosophically, and has great theological potential if true, but, there's something I can't picture: When Paul was writing on election and predestination in Romans (for example), was he thinking 'middle-knowledge is how God effected this'? I think it was not." Here's the objector's presupposition: Scriptural authors completely understood, philosophically, how the truth of what the Holy Spirit told them works. This is, I think, something Christian's should not feel compelled to hold. I totally affirm that Paul, for example, understood that God predestines us-- but I don't affirm that he necessarily understood just how that works. Similarly, I doubt any of the authors of Scripture could philosophically explain the Trinity, though at least most of them would explicitly affirm it. Now, I've written this in a hurry, so my explanation has not been polished, but the point is clear, I think. Any thoughts?

Augustine and The Spirit as "Love"

2006-04-08T00:08:00.000-05:00

I recently quoted Augustine in De Trinitate VIII at length where he sees in the very act of love, a trace of the Trinity itself. Augustine ponders on the Jesus’ words in Matt. 22:40. There, Christ tells us that the whole of the Law and the prophets can be summed up by loving God and loving your neighbor. Yet we are often instructed in Scripture to love God in one instance and to love our neighbor in another, but not both simultaneously. What then? Are the biblical writers contradicting what Christ has said? Not so, Augustine remarks. For God Himself is love (I John 4:7-8), and the man who loves his neighbor loves love itself (much as the man who loves good things loves the good itself), and thus the one who loves love actually loves God. In Augustine’s words: because God is love, the man who loves love certainly loves God; and the man who loves his brother must love love. So then this loving act of the mind itself is Trinitarian for there you have three equally necessary things in the act of loving—the one who is the lover, the one being loved, and the love itself. For the mind to love, it must love something, and for it to love something, it must love love. “There you are with three, the lover, what is being loved, and love.” Now Augustine does not immediately attempt to identify which member of the Godhead is the Lover, the Beloved, or the Loving. However, he will later return to this and give some hints of his insights. It seems clear that Augustine, while emphasizing the unity and equality of all three members of the Godhead, wants to carry on the tradition he inherited from the East of the Father being Fons Divinitas—or the “fountainhead of deity.” So then, the Father is the Lover. The Son is the Beloved as the Scriptures often presents Him, e.g. Eph. 1:6: which he freely bestowed upon us in the beloved one. The Spirit then is the Love, or the gift of mutual love that ties the both together. And the mutual love between the Father and the Son is actually a love of Love itself, and this Love is the Holy Spirit. (Parenthetically centuries later, Richard of St. Victor will elaborate even more holding that for mutual love to be perfect, there must be love shared with a third person. So then perfect love is not in the I-thou relationship but instead when there is a “co-beloved” as the Holy Spirit is to the Father and the Son. So the Trinity is a communion of love: The Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father, but for either to love the other, each must love Love Itself, which is the Holy Spirit). Now Augustine’s analogy is just that. An analogy. And he himself after stating it, promptly sets it aside to find something better. But this analogy doesn’t sit well with many contemporary theologians. According to some of my professors, the doctrine of the Trinity is in dire straights in the West. The Holy Spirit, it is said, has been so depersonalized that He is hardly ever considered in Christian scholarship, and has nearly vanished into irrelevance in the religious life of believers. But what has brought this about? Why is the Holy Spirit so often depersonalized? Was it one of the ill effects of the Enlightenment? The net result of the “every man for himself” approach to Scripture interpretation practiced by Protestants? The work of the Enemy? Bad hermeneutics? The tendency among evangelicals to emphasize the work and person of Christ to the neglect of the other divine Persons? “Nay,” I was told. It was none of these things. Rather, the problem of depersonalizing the Spirit that is so prevalent in the West actually finds its root cause in that dreaded analogy of Love that Augustine propounded in De Trinitate VIII. And for a long time I parroted this notion. After all, in the analogy, the Father is personalized as a Lover. The Son, moreover, is personalized, being called “the Beloved One.” But the Spirit is referred to as the impersonal Love that is shared with the Father and the Son. This notion of the Spirit as an impersonal seems to be reflected in Western art where the Father and Son are often depicted in the form of persons, while the Spirit is depicted using impersonal objects like doves, and even inanimate entities like fire. What choice then, did Christians in the West have, but to think of the Holy Spirit as non-personal. I sometimes wonder whether these theologians are secretly suspicious of the biblical writers themselves, what with all those neuter names given to the Holy Spirit like רוּחַ and πνεύματος, “breath” or “wind” (well at least it’s neuter in Greek since Hebrew has only masculine and feminine). While the Father and Son are expressly objectified for us (the Father in His miraculous works, the Son in His incarnation), the Spirit is often elusive, frequently seen as an agent of power—the means by which the Father accomplishes great acts, or the saints endure suffering; He is experienced subjectively. Even more, we are regularly reminded in the Gospels that the Son came to do naught but to glorify the Father. We are also told that the Spirit comes to do naught but to glorify the Son. But nowhere are we told that the Father or the Son comes to glorify the Spirit. And why is it that the Spirit is so often imaged as non-personal objects? In the baptismal scene of Luke 3:21-22, the Son comes to the water as a man. The Father speaks with a voice from heaven, “You are my beloved Son…” But the Spirit comes as a mere dove. And again, when in Acts 2:1-4 the Spirit came upon the believers gathered at Pentecost, he did not come with a human-like voice from heaven as the Father does, nor was He incarnate as a man like the Son. Instead, He came as a wind and as tongues of fire. So do contemporary theologians fault the writers of Scripture for de-personalizing the Spirit too? It seems to me that there is a certain hiddeness to the Person of the Spirit and perhaps it is intended to be just so in the economic Trinity. It is this hiddeness, I think, that Augustine is trying to capture by giving the Spirit the name “Love” (he also uses “Gift”).

Ongoing at Culture Watch

2006-04-07T17:38:00.000-05:00

There is a terrific exchange taking place at Doug Groothuis's blog, Culture Watch, in the comments of "Reporting on an Evening with Atheists." Up to 72 comments already, it is a lengthy but worthwhile read-- especially if you're interested in apologetics/phil of religion. Enjoy! UPDATE-- The discussion continues, though it is (as one may expect) fizzling out. It seems as though Luke (atheist) is running out of back-peddling room; Tim has quite capably defended his position. Still worth a read, the thread is far more interesting (in my opinion) early on.

A Kinder, Gentler [Gnostic] Judas

2006-04-07T12:42:00.000-05:00

Just in time for easter, the National Geographic Channel is presenting a special program on the now widely publicized Gospel of Judas, Sunday April 9th. You can check out their site for a preview. Ben Whitheringon also has a post (and possibly more to come) on the matter.

Moreland's Substance Dualism Part II: An Argument from the Indexicality of Thoughts

2006-04-04T13:42:00.000-05:00

We turn now to survey an argument offered by Moreland to support substance dualism. I have chosen this one from among his extensive arsenal simply because I find it interesting and compelling. Also known as the argument from the experience of first-person subjectivity, this line of reasoning seems true prima facie. It is based largely on a proper understanding of indexicals (expressions of a first-person point of view, e.g., I, here, now), but is helped considerably by first-person introspection. Before delving into the argument itself, a review of these concepts will no doubt prove helpful.

Introspection is nothing new. It is, in fact, the oldest research technique in psychology. There are various types of introspection, but we are interested only in its cognitive form. Introspection comes in two levels: (1) Simple, which refers to a direct report of sensations, feelings, and/or thoughts, and (2) reflective, which refers to one’s reactions (both cognitive and affective) to what one is experiencing and reporting. Hilary Kornblith has observed:

If we wish to know what is going on in someone else’s mind, we must observe their behaviour; on the basis of what we observe, we may sometimes reasonably draw a conclusion about the person’s mental state. Thus, for example, on seeing someone smile, we infer whether they are upset. But this is not, at least typically, the way in which we come to know our own mental states. We do not need to examine our own behaviour in order to know how we feel, what we believe, what we want and so on…. The term used to describe this special mode of access which we seem to have to our own mental states is ‘introspection.1

Thus, “you experience goings-on in the world, and, turning inward (“introspecting”), you experience your experiencing. 2 Though we are considering introspection only insofar as it may provide support for the argument from the indexicality of thoughts, it is worth noting that Moreland does base another argument on it alone.3

As indicated above, indexicals are basically expressions of a first-person point of view. These include such terms as I, here, now, there, then: Here and now refer to where and when I am; there and then are where and when I am not. ’I’ is the most basic indexical and refers to a self that is known by acquaintance with one's own consciousness in acts of self-awareness. ‘I’ am immediately aware of my own self and ‘I’ know who ‘I’ refers to when ‘I’ use it; it refers to an individual as the self-conscious self-reflexive owner of his own body and mental states.4

We take these words to be token-reflexive, that is, they systematically change their referents in a context-dependent way.5 For example, if two individuals simultaneously utter the phrase “I am here,” (which undoubtedly happens daily), are they each saying the exact same thing? Of course not; the statements are context-dependent. When person A says, “I am here,” she is referring to herself, as well as to a certain place. The same goes for person B. Even if they were arriving simultaneously at the same place, they would still not be saying the same thing: each phrase has a unique referent, namely, the speaker.

Subjective states of experience also exist. These experiences are such that I have a unique, first-person perspective of them; they are experiences of my “I” that cannot be reduced to third-person characterizations. This is often described by saying there is “something it is like” to having these experiences (e.g., what it is like to be me, what it is like for me to hear a bird singing), something, the content of which, cannot be captured without indexical language.

A completely physicalist description of the world would be one in which everything would be exhaustively describable from a third-person point of view in terms of objects, properties, processes, and their spatiotemporal locations.6 This points to the falsity of physicalism because “according to physicalism, there are no fundamentally basic or intrinsic (irreducible), privileged first-person perspectives.”7 Moreland approvingly quotes Thomas Nagel (a philosopher devoid of any religious tendencies) concerning this:

If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features [the sounds, colors, smells, tastes of experience that make the experience what it is] must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible.8

Thus, a formal argument may be formed:

(1) Statements using the first-person indexical ‘I’ express facts about persons that cannot be expressed in statements without the first-person indexical. (2) If I am a physical object, then all the facts about me can be expressed in statements without the first-person indexical. (3) Therefore, I am not a physical object. (4) I am either a physical object or an immaterial substance. (5) Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.9

1 “Introspection: Epistemology of,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. by Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), emphasis mine.

2 John Heil, “Awareness,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd ed., ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999).

3 The argument goes as follows (as in “The Soul and Life Everlasting: Introduction,” 434). (1)I am an unextended centre of consciousness (justified by introspection). (2) No physical object is an unextended centre of consciousness. (3)Therefore, I am not a physical object. (4)Either I am a physical object or an immaterial substance. (5)Therefore, I am an immaterial substance.

4 Moreland, “Body and Soul Part II: Why the Soul is Immaterial,” in Facts for Faith, no. 7, 2001, available online .

5 See Philosophical Foundations, 294.

6 “Body and Soul Part II: Why the Soul is Immaterial.”

7 “Physicalism, Naturalism and the Nature of Human Persons,” 233.

8 “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,1979), 167, quoted in Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, 86.

9 “The Soul and Life Everlasting: Introduction,” 436.

Simplicity and the Divine Persons

2006-04-03T12:52:00.000-05:00

Although most christian thinkers today reject the doctrine of Divine Simplicity, the view was nearly universally held among the Patristic and Medeival theologians. I provide here a brief passage from Augustine's City of God XI. 10 where he (seemingly paranthetically, as it interrupts his discourse on angels) ponders on Simplicity and the Three Persons in God.

There is, accordingly, a good which is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable, and this is God. By this Good have all others been created, but not simple, and therefore not unchangeable. "Created," I say -- that is, made, not begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple Good is simple as itself, and the same as itself. These two we call the Father and the Son; and both together with the Holy Spirit are one God; and to this Spirit the epithet Holy is in Scripture, as it were, appropriated. And He is another than the Father and the Son, for He is neither the Father nor the Son. I say "another," not "another thing," because He is equally with them the simple Good, unchangeable and co-eternal. And this Trinity is one God; and none the less simple because a Trinity. For we do not say that the nature of the good is simple, because the Father alone possesses it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Ghost alone; nor do we say, with the Sabellian heretics, that it is only nominally a Trinity, and has no real distinction of persons; but we say it is simple, because it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the persons to one another. For, in regard to this relation, it is true that the Father has a Son, and yet is not Himself the Son; and the Son has a Father, and is not Himself the Father. But, as regards Himself, irrespective of relation to the other, each is what He has; thus, He is in Himself living, for He has life, and is Himself the Life which He has. It is for this reason, then, that the nature of the Trinity is called simple, because it has not anything which it can lose, and because it is not one thing and its contents another, as a cup and the liquor, or a body and its color, or the air and the light or heat of it, or a mind and its wisdom. For none of these is what it has: the cup is not liquor, nor the body color, nor the air light and heat, nor the mind wisdom. And hence they can be deprived of what they have, and can be turned or changed into other qualities and states, so that the cup may be emptied of the liquid of which it is full, the body be discolored, the air darken, the mind grow silly...
According to this, then, those things which are essentially and truly divine are called simple, because in them quality and substance are identical, and because they are divine, or wise, or blessed in themselves, and without extraneous supplement. In Holy Scripture, it is true, the Spirit of wisdom is called "manifold" because it contains many things in it; but what it contains it also is, and it being one is all these things. For neither are there many wisdoms, but one, in which are untold and infinite treasures of things intellectual, wherein are all invisible and unchangeable reasons of things visible and changeable which were created by it. For God made nothing unwittingly; not even a human workman can be said to do so. But if He knew all that He made, He made only those things which He had known. Whence flows a very striking but true conclusion, that this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known to God.

Augustine On the Trinitarian Analogy of Love

2006-04-02T18:37:00.000-05:00

Now up till this point in De Trinitate VIII, he insists that God is nothing less than Truth itself and Goodness itself and that one can attain to the knowledge of God through understanding Truth and Goodness. But there is yet a more excellent way by which we might attain to the knowledge of God, and that is through Love. So while we would have innitially thought that Augustine would have found a Trinitarian analogy in Truth or Goodness, he does not . At least not directly. Rather, he finds it in Love which is a speicies of the Good. And Love, unlike Truth or Goodness, is not merely some abstract notion that the mind apprehends, but it is really an act that the mind performs. This in turn opens the doorway to his other trinitarian analogies.

But what is love or charity, which divine Scripture so greatly praises and proclaims, except the love of the good? But love is of some one that loves, and with love something is loved. Behold, then, there are three things: he that loves, and that which is loved, and love. What, then, is love, except a certain life which couples or seeks to couple together some two things, namely, him that loves, and that which is loved? And this is so even in outward and carnal loves. But that we may drink in something more pure and clear, let us tread down the flesh and ascend to the mind. What does the mind love in a friend except the mind? There, then, also are three things: he that loves, and that which is loved, and love. It remains to ascend also from hence, and to seek those things which are above, as far as is given to man. But here for a little while let our purpose rest, not that it may think itself to have found already what it seeks; but just as usually the place has first to be found where anything is to be sought, while the thing itself is not yet found, but we have only found already where to look for it; so let it suffice to have said thus much, that we may have, as it were, the hinge of some starting-point, whence to weave the rest of our discourse.
De Trinitate VIII. 10. 14

An Indication of the Church’s State of Preparedness?

2006-04-01T11:12:00.000-06:00

You’re all familiar, I’m sure, with Dan Brown’s recent novel The Da Vinci Code. The (well deserved) hype surrounding both the novel and movie virtually guarantee this. I, for one, am quite eager for the latter’s debut! But is the Church? Well, anyone with a taste for intrigue is ready, in the sense of eager, for it. But what about intellectually, that is, historically and doctrinally? Are Christians prepared intellectually? Let me explain what I’m getting at. Consider first what I’m not referring to: I don’t mean have our preachers put together a great sermon series, jumping to inform the churches concerning Brown’s story. I don’t mean have we all leapt to schedule the Darrell Bock’s, the Blomberg’s, and so forth (that is, the ‘experts’) to guest speak to our congregations. I don’t mean have we put copies of Breaking the Da Vinci Code on sale in our welcoming centers. By no means is this my inquiry. And for Pete’s sake, I don’t mean are we encouraging our flock’s to boycott the film! Now, please don’t misunderstand: I have tremendous respect for Darrell Bock et al. Moreover, I am pleased and thankful for their willingness to travel from church to church speaking (in this instance) on The Da Vinci Code. Goodness knows every church around Dallas (and I’m sure elsewhere) is scrambling (really, falling all over themselves) to schedule such speakers. But what I’m asking is this: Why? Why is this happening? Why do our ministers need to skip even a beat on behalf of this story? Why aren’t our flocks reading such stories and laughing (not because they think, for example, that the prospect of Jesus and Mary being married is funny, but rather because they already know that such notions are absurd—because they are intellectually prepared)? Is this instance any indication of the Church’s state of preparedness against such cultural phenomena? I don’t know; I don’t consider myself qualified to answer such questions. What I do know is this: there should be no need for last minute preparations for our churches concerning such things. I fully appreciate the vital role apologists, philosophers, historians, and theologians play in the Church. But is that role only to be called upon at the last minute? Of course not, yet it seems that is what has happened. Please, let’s take steps to correct this “scandal of (our) evangelical mind.”

Daniel Dennett and Alister McGrath on Religion

2006-03-29T20:52:00.000-06:00

Thanks to Matt Mullins over and Prosblogion you can check out an interesting audio exchange between Daniel Dennett and Alister McGrath. Also you can find a PDF copy of McGrath's arguments here.

Moreland's Substance Dualism: Part 1

2006-03-20T16:21:00.000-06:00

This is the first of a two part post on J. P. Moreland's version of Substance Dualism. As such, you won't see too much original thinking; the point (for now) is to present (accurately, I hope) Moreland's position. Why? Well, it's just easier than coming up with one myself. In part 2 I will present one (of many) of Moreland's supporting arguments. Among responses to the perennial (and often nebulous) debate known as the Mind/Body problem, J. P. Moreland has defended a position of Substance Dualism. This he defines as "the view that the soul- I, the self, mind- is an immaterial substance different from the body to which it is related." So, "I am my soul and I have a body." By way of distinction, property dualism claims "a person is a living physical body having mind, the mind consisting, however, of nothing but a more or less continuous series of conscious or unconscious states and events...which are the effects but never the causes of bodiliy activity." We may futher distinguish Moreland as a Thomistic substance dualist, rather than Cartesian (this at his behest). The dissimilarities are subtle and impertenent (I'm sure one of you Aquinas or Descartes scholars will make me pay for that claim), so we won't linger on them. Suffice it to say that Moreland understands Descartes to (1) have incorrectly reduced the soul to the mind, and (2) have mistakenly distinguished between two seperable substances- mind and body (whereas Moreland recognizes only one substance- the soul, with the body being an ensouled biological and physical structure that depends on the soul for its existence). Concerning (1), Moreland (as a Thomistic dualist) holds that the soul contains, among other things, the faculty of mind (which, incidentally, identifies him as a dichotomist). Hence, the soul is much more than the mind, and the two ought not be conflated. As for (2), Cartesian dualists argue that the body is a physical, ordered aggregate fully describable in physical terms: the mind is related to the mind only via an external, causal relationship. Moreland, on the other hand, though agreeing the body is a physical structure, argues that it is not an aggregate: the body needs the soul. The body, it is claimed, is made human by the presence of the soul diffused equally throughout. This, obviously, is meant to be an overview- it is merely a catalyst for discussion. If you are familiar with Moreland's work, much of the above phraseology probably rung a bell: that's because a good deal of it came straight from several of his works. I did not include a bibliography for the sake of space, if you want sources: ask (nicely) and ye shall receive!

Eternity, Divine Knowledge, and Theories of Time

2006-03-14T19:53:00.000-06:00

The guys over at Prosblogion have been really going at it in a couple of recent posts over the questions of atemporalism, A and B theories of time, libertarianism, Banezianism and Molinism, and a host of others. The first post by Kevin Timpe, Divine Eternity and Libertarian Free Will, addresses the question of...well, divine eternity and libertarian free will. Jeremey Pierce follows up with another post on Divine Atemporality and Tensed Facts. Check it out when you get a chance.

Plantinga's Take on the Dover Decision on ID

2006-03-11T14:21:00.000-06:00

Eminent Philosopher Alvin Plantinga's thoughts are here.

Kripkology 101

2006-03-07T23:31:00.000-06:00

I've been working through Saul Kripke's Naming And Necessity and I recently stumbled across this gem on page 64. Commenting on the cluster concept notion of proper names he says:

Let me state then what the cluster concept theory of names is. It really is a nice theory. (The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong. You may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place; but I hope not, because I'm sure it's wrong too if it is a theory.)

Priceless!

Καλός

2006-03-05T21:08:00.000-06:00

After watching several of Hollywood's finest parade on the red carpet tonight at the Oscars, I thought I might meditate on the true nature of beauty. And who better to turn to than Plato.

When a man has been thus far tutored in the lore of love, passing from view to view of beautiful things, in the right and regular ascent, suddenly he will have revealed to him, as he draws to the close of his dealings in love, a wondrous vision, beautiful in its nature; all his previous labors, Socrates, were for the sake of this!
Symposium 210E

Unlike the beautiful things that we ordinarily experience that are beautiful at one time but not the other, or are beautiful in some respect but not the other, this Beauty is itself altogether unchanging, eternal, and unqualifiedly beautiful (211A).

Chuck Norris

2006-03-02T14:03:00.000-06:00

For all you die-hard Chuck Norris fans out there I found a link to this over at Tu Quoque. I couldn't stop laughing.

Faith & Philosophy

2006-02-22T16:24:00.000-06:00

I regret making a post out of this, but it may be the only way for me to get an answer: Where is my January 2006 issue of Faith & Philosophy?!? I've read similar inquiries at other blogs, but never an informed response. I've emailed SCP, but gotten no response. Does anyone know the truth???

Breaking Dennett's Spell?

2006-02-21T22:28:00.000-06:00

Leon Wieseltier has given a sharp review of Daniel Dennett's latest book, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon over here at the New York Times book review. I really want to get my hands on this book. If Wieseltier is right, it looks like Dennett has taken the easy road once again: Evaluate religion not by examining its truth claims, but (taking a page from Freud) by pointing out religion's allegedly disreputable origin--which of course for Dennett is purely naturalistic.

New Member of Summa Philosophiae

2006-02-16T16:36:00.000-06:00

As you may have noticed we have a new contributor to the blog here. Please welcome our newest member and fellow blogger Clint. Clint enjoys figure skating, shaving, and taking long walks on the beach. A speculative fellow he is, pondering such questions as, "Are there any objects that do not exist?" and "Is the cat really on the mat?" It is even said that he was so enraptured in thought once that he spent nearly 48 hrs pondering whether Hume himself should have been consigned to the flames.

Original Sin and Christian Philosophy Part III

2006-02-16T14:58:00.000-06:00

Was Sin Accidental? A metaphysician seeks to understand the nature of reality. What is it that constitutes a table, a Coca-Cola, a roll of toilet paper, etc.. For instance, a roll of toilet paper as a substance might be said to have the properties of whiteness, roundness and softness (if it is Charmin). The toilet paper is a substance which has certain properties. A substance is simply something that can have properties but that cannot be had by any other thing. For instance, the hair on my head has the properties of softness, brownness and possibly many others. My hair, however, cannot be had by anything else, thus it is not a property. This is not to be confused with the property of being my hair, which can be had. However, my hair may not always possess the property of brownness or even softness. One day it may possess the property of grayness or whiteness, but it will always possess the property of being hair, whatever that may look like. Note that this model seems to indicate that there are different types of properties. This sort of study has had much practical application for the study of original sin and its relation to the nature of Christ. Thomas V. Morris, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, provides an ingenious metaphysical theory for navigating around the problem of original sin for Christ. In his book, The Logic of God Incarnate, Morris articulates the differences between what many philosophers have termed essential properties and accidental properties. Yet what are the differences between these properties and what, if any, are the practical implications for the nature of Christ? The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (CDP) defines them as following: Essential property- A property is essential to an entity if, necessarily, the entity cannot exist without being an instance of the property (eg. Being a number is an essential property of nine) . Accidental property- A property is accidental to an individual if it is possible for the individual to exist without being an instance of the property (eg. being the number of planets is an accidental property of nine). Morris believes that sin is an accidental not an essential property of humanity. Therefore, Christ could have all the essential properties of humanity without being tainted by sin. It is in my opinion that Morris is onto something here. Understanding sin as an accidental property would seem to correlate to Adam and Eve both being without sin until they exercised their will to disobey God. It was upon disobedience that sin was predicated, instantiated, or had by Adam and Eve as an accidental property, one that is common to all humanity but is not essential to being human (as is the case with Christ). How does this theory hold up under philosophical scrutiny? Does anyone have any thoughts as to what might be good or bad about this theory? In conclusion, much could be said concerning exactly what the essential properties of God are and exactly how they cohere with the essential properties of man. However, I have not pursued this since the recent topics (of this site) have been addressing the “original sin” of man. As always, for those of you brave enough to venture there…please do so!

Leftow On Divine Ideas

2006-02-09T23:33:00.000-06:00

Brian Leftow recently assumed Swinburne's chair as the the Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford University--which is no small feat! I have been trying to find information on his Divine Ideas for a while now. As far as I can determine, this book has been dubbed"Forthcoming" for the past 10 years. Where is it? I keep finding references to it everywhere. Plantinga actually cites it in Christian Philosophy At the End of the 20th Century (1995) as already published by Ithaca: Cornell Press 1994, but the book is nowhere to be found. Any Leftow readers out there with information? UPDATE (2/14/06): I emailed Leftow and he sent me a pretty prompt response. He's been working on a manuscript of Divine Ideas for a long time now but he keeps changing some of his ideas and views. He's basically done with the thing now and the book should be out in print early next year.

Original Sin and Christian Philosophy II: Presuppositions

2006-01-30T17:22:00.000-06:00

As the title indicates, this post is part of a work in progress. Our project is to work toward a philosophically precise articulation of original sin, especially its nature and extent (and effects. The reader would do well to skim Original Sin & Christian Philosophy I). Thus far, I’ve turned up two well-written and informed articles relevant to the topic at hand. They are “Original Sin and Christian Philosophy” by Paul Copan, and “The Metaphysics of Original Sin” by Michael Rea (this post is heavily influenced by the latter). As always, please mention any others you recommend in the comments. Obviously, I hold more than these four presuppositions; I’m only troubling myself with these four. Throughout this discussion I will assume the following: (S1) All human beings (except, at most, four) suffer from a kind of corruption that makes it inevitable that they will fall into sin, & this corruption is a consequence of the first sin of the first man. And (S2) All human beings (except, at most, four) are guilty from birth in the eyes of God, and this guilt is a consequence of the first sin of the first man. (Rea, 1). Now, the doctrine of original sin (DOS), I believe, includes both of these assumptions; if you lack either one, you aren’t, in my opinion, dealing with DOS. It is significant to note, however, that one may accept only (S2) as one’s DOS. What of these; are each acceptable? Scripture supports the universality of human corruption as viewed by (S1) & (S2) above (see esp., Ps 14, 130:3, 143:2; Ecc 7:20; Is 53:6; Rom 3:9ff, 23, 5:12 ;Gal 3:22 ;Eph 2:3; 1 Jn 5:19). Even in the verses which do not explicitly do so, the universality of sin is assumed (Erickson, Christian Theology, 641). Consider also the reality of death as proof of this understanding of DOS: death is the explicit & direct result of sin, we all die (known from common experience), thus we are all affected. So, I accept the universality of DOS. Please note that while I am affirming that Scripture teaches we are connected to Adam’s sin, that is all I am presently doing; we have thus far said nothing of just how we are so connected. Also, as Copan notes: “We should distinguish between damage or consequences for one’s sin and the guilt of one’s sin. For example…the consequences of one man’s sin affects (the) well-being of the entire community” (p. 15, cf. Joshua 7 & 2 Sam 24:17). Rea continues on to embrace (MR) A person P is morally responsible for the obtaining of a state of affairs S only if S obtains (or obtained) and P could have prevented S from obtaining (Rea, 3). I am inclined to agree with him that this seems intuitively true; upon reflection I cannot disagree with it. But if we accept DOS, then it seems we have a problem with accepting (MR). Rea continues on to (successfully, I think) reconcile these two in his paper. His task frequently takes him out of the scope of ours, but along the way he is able to shed much light on our project. At any rate, if you are willing to flush (MR), then you will probably not enjoy the ensuing discussion. I might also recommend that you look a bit further into the issue, but in the end I suppose you are entitled to think whatever you like. Of course, many in the Reformed tradition do just this—they reject (MR). I will also assume a libertarian account of human freedom. I realize there is much debate surrounding such a claim, but it is not my intention to entertain that debate in much detail here (but I look forward to doing so in future posts!). So, unless it absolutely infuriates you that I claim such a position, please refrain from promoting that debate for now. Finally, I’d like to reiterate the importance of presuppositions (without launching a full-on Intro to Phil lecture). They’re important, trust me. I have not identified them all, in fact, I’m confident in my inability to identify every one of mine (a start would be the existence of God, an affirmation of certain of his qualities such as justness, and much more besides), but I think I’ve covered the essentially relevant ones. I know this is a short post that doesn’t really get into the meat of the issue, but I think it’s worthwhile for us consider these things first. More to come.

Original Sin and Christian Philosophy

2006-01-27T16:50:00.000-06:00

The perennial debate over the nature and extent of original sin underlies nearly every aspect of Christianity. This is especially true of any attempt at distinctively Christian anthropology. While this seems to have been a traditionally theological problem, I am convinced that Christian philosophy (I have in mind here contemporary philosophy) has much to offer toward an acceptable version of this doctrine; a philosophically precise articulation of original sin is needed. Toward this end philosopher Paul Copan has written “Original Sin and Christian Philosophy” (in Philosophia Christi, Series 2, 5/2 (2003): 519-41). Now, before you all start thinking that I am about to end the debate, let me clarify two things: (1) I’m not qualified to offer to exhaustive, philosophically precise exposition of Christian anthropology, and (2) even if I were so qualified, a blog is not the place to do so. So, why this post? My goal is to spark a discussion that will encourage our community to shift its attention to this neglected (at least philosophically neglected) area. Any thorough articulation of the doctrine of original sin entails treatment of the imago Dei, grace, our connection to Adam and much else. Most professed Christians agree that somehow original sin affects our nature. But exactly how? Unfortunately, it seems that theologians and philosophers merely talk past one another here. I realize this is a gross generalization, but while ‘nature’ for theologians is simply a word, it is for philosophers a term. This doctrine also has serious apologetical implications. We know that humanity is depraved, though there is some debate concerning its extent and the result of prevenient/common grace (and other areas). “Why should I answer for Adam’s sin?” “I would have responded differently than Adam did.” Such questions must be answered from an apologetical standpoint. What is the best approach to this issue? Do you have some great relevant articles or books to recommend to the rest of us? I think it’s time for theologians and philosophers to get on the same page and begin presenting, insofar as we are able, a unified front with answers to the world (1 Peter 3:15).

Hick On Religious Pluralism

2006-01-25T12:52:00.000-06:00

Traditionally, Christianity has supposed that its central claims are true and that where these claims conflict with those of other religions, the latter are to be seen as false. But in some parts of the globe nowadays, such a view is no longer seen as acceptable. Many would deride it as religious imperialism or arrogance (or worse). Others argue that it is somehow arbitrary or unjustified. Some like John Hick opt for what is called religious pluralism. Religious pluralism argues (at least by its more sophisticated defenders) that no one religion can be considered as normative or superior to others, but that all the major religions are historico-culturally conditioned responses to the one ultimate reality. Hick is well known for his labors especially in philosophy of religion (for example his seminal work, An Interpretation of Religion was so pivotal in shaping the discussion on religions that he received the 1991 Grawemeyer Award for the most significant new thinking in religion). But how does Hick arrive at religious pluralism? All the major religions, according to Hick, are in ‘contact’ with the same divine reality. But how can this be so when there is so much diversity among the great religious traditions? The answer, Hick argues, is that historical and cultural factors affect the way in which a given religious tradition perceive this transcendent Reality—that is, the differing conceptions of ultimate reality are historically and culturally conditioned responses to this ultimate Reality. Thus, "…we always perceive the transcendent through the lens of a particular religious culture with its distinctive set of concepts, myths, historical exemplars and devotional or meditational techniques. And it is this inexpugnable human contribution to religious awareness that accounts for the fascinating variations of religious thought, experience and practice…" (An Interpretation of Religion, 8). Taking Immanuel Kant's epistemological distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon, Hick affirms a distinction between the religious Ultimate an sich and the religious Ultimate as it is experienced. The former Hick will refer to as "the Real." Kant had argued that in all perceiving, we never perceive a thing "in itself" but rather our mind is actively involved in shaping what it is that we perceive. It is this that Hick applies to his theory of religion. For Hick, the Real is never the direct object of experience. Rather, the Real is the "divine noumenon" that is experienced within the various religious traditions as the range of 'divine phenomena. That is, the Real in itself is never what is perceived. What is perceived is its cultural and historical manifestations. These manifestations can be personal, like Yahweh, Allah, Krishna etc.; or impersonal, like Brahman, Nirvana, etc. Because the real is ineffable, we cannot posit anything about it that is common to its manifestations. That is, we cannot say of the Real that it is personal (as in theism) or that it is impersonal (as in monism); we cannot say that it is loving or benevolent or holy anything of that sort. No human concepts can be applied to the Real—it is wholly ineffable. Hick suggests then, that this might be the the answer to the problem of conflicting truth claims among the various religions. He does not claim that "all religions teach the same thing", that would be patently false. Rather, they have the same ground (he might say). Their conflicting truth claims can be attributed to cultural and historical factors. But why is Hick motivated to postulate the existence of the Real? He will respond that the common effect that the various religious traditions have on mankind 'testify' to its existence. And what is this "common effect?" It is the "transformation from self-centredness to Reality-centredness." Hick takes this transformation as salvation/liberation and understood this way, all the major religions have equal validity and all provide paths to salvation. But how do we know when this transformation/salvation has taken place? Hick argues that we know transformation has taken place by the "spiritual and moral fruits found in the lives of exemplary believers within the respective traditions." Those who have been thus transformed will exhibit love, compassion for all life along with joy, inner peace, strength, etc. So Hick pulls from the various religious traditions people of upright moral standings as examples: From Tibetan Buddhism, the Dhali Lama; from Christianity, Jesus; from Vedantic Hinduism, Shankara, and so on. This is why then, Hick finds the traditional Christian claim to the uniqueness of Christ and the superiority of Christianity to other religions so repulsive. Indeed, he just finds it , arrogant. Instead, Hick insists, the various religions must "modify" their central claims to accommodate one another and to give an account for the Real. Thus in The Myth of God Incarnate, he siezes that most central of Christian teaching, the doctrine of the incarnation, offering a staggeringly reductionistic interpretation of it as an example of the sort of "modification" he has in mind. But alas, as brave as his atttempt might be, Hick's extremely made-over Jesus leaves a lot to be desired.

Religion and Naturalism: The Rea-Dennett Exchange

2006-01-19T12:51:00.000-06:00

This 2003 exchange between Michael Rea and Daniel Dennett has drawn a lot of attention. For those of you out there really into these sorts of debates (you know who you are), check out this short but interesting dialogue.

"To Infinity And Beyond!"

2006-01-14T22:00:00.000-06:00

What exactly does it mean to be ‘infinite?’ I know we often use the term for rhetorical flourish (usually in hyperbole or embellishment), but what precisely does it mean? The other night a friend at the Dallas Socratic Society discussion group, Brett, read a fantastic paper, Examining Infinite Set Possibilities. Brett’s aim was simply to sketch out some coherent ways we can speak about infinity and infinite sets. Aristotle long ago, Brett reminded us, gave us the traditional view of infinity:

…it is always possible to think of a larger number; for the number of times a magnitude can be bisected is infinite. Hence the infinite is potential,never actual; the number of parts that can be taken always surpasses any assigned number. Physics 207 b8

So if Aristotle is right, an actual infinite set is just impossible because one can always add another member to the set. But if this is true, then the set is always finite. William Craig uses the notion of the impossibility of an actual infinite to bolster the second premise in the Kalam argument. The Kalam argument, recall, makes the following move:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause 2. The universe began to exist 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause

Craig supports (2) by (among other things) arguing for the impossibility of an actual infinite series of events in time:

4. The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one member after another. 5. A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually infinite. 6. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.

I should say that Carl Sagan may have been a smart cosmologist, but this argument makes his proclaimation about the universe being "all that ever was, is, or will be," appear quite silly. Now while I readily accept the notion that an actual infinite set consisting of concrete individuals is just impossible, the Platonist in me is quite willing to accept the notion of an actual infinite set of abstract objects. After voicing this in the discussion, another friend Sloan—who I should say is far smarter than I—roundly criticized me for embracing this view. But I can’t shake it. It seems to me that sets containing members like possible worlds, numbers and other abstracta, are actually infinite! What’s wrong with me? Am I just a Platonist gone wild!?

Sovereignty and Abstract Objects

2005-12-28T21:22:00.000-06:00

You might recall a few weeks back I had a post on "Aseity and Abstract Objects" hinting at some of the problems that arise if we grant that (1) God has a nature--a property or group of properties that He has essentially and that are distinct from Him. and (2) God exists "a se"--God depends on nothing distinct from Himself for His existence. I had planned on a follow-up post looking at another facet on the problem of God and abstract objects, namely, the question of divine sovereignty. Imagine my delight when I found that Simon recently commented on the very subject, doing a far better job than I would have. Check out his post yourself. Let me just add my 2 cents however: Suppose we define Sovereignty thus: (3) Whatever is distinct from God depends on God for its existence How does this square with the Platonic thesis of necessarily existing abstract entities? After all, if such things are necessary (that is to say, their non-existence is impossible), how can they depend on God for their existence? It would seem, as Plantinga wonders, that their existence isn't "up to God." Moreover, consider the very character of such abstract entities. Take for example, the property omniscience. Its character is such that whatever entity, x, has it, for every true proposition p, x knows that p. But it does not seem that this characteristic of omniscience is "up to God." So then how should we understand divine sovereignty if it seems that the existence and character of abstract objects are not "up to God?"

Are you suffering from Theological Myopia?

2005-12-28T16:06:00.000-06:00

Attention bloggers, Jonathan Moorhead has an excellent post on warning signs that you might be suffering from Theological Myopia. Symptoms include: (1) Your blog is named after a certain brand of theology. (2) Every post you produce relates to your pet theological system. (3) Anyone who disagrees with you is not saved. (4) Every book from your “Favorite Books” list is from the 20th century. (5) Your avatar names your pet theology. (6) Your sole purpose for reading books opposed to your theology is to pillage them for “heretical” statements.

Human Nature and the Incarnation

2005-12-26T21:51:00.000-06:00

Speaking of the incarnation, Freddoso got me thinking again. It is generally acknowledged by Christians that the Son freely assumed a human nature--a nature hypostatically united to Himself. So it must be that case that He is contingently human. But what of this: Is it likewise true that Christ's human nature is contingently united to the divine person? Or put differently, is the following proposition true, (P) There a possible world W and a time t such that (i) Christ's human nature, N, exists at t in W and (ii) N is not united to a divine person. I think the question is deceptively complex.

The Definition of Chalcedon

2005-12-25T15:15:00.000-06:00

This being Christmas day, what better to post than this: "Following the holy Fathers we teach with one voice that the Son [of God] and our Lord Jesus Christ is to be confessed as one and the same [Person], that he is perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood, very God and very man, of a resonable soul and [human] body consisting, consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead, and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood; made in all things like unto us, sin only excepted; begotten of his Father before the worlds according to his Godhead; but in these last days for us men and for our salvation born [into the world] of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God according to his manhood. This one and the same Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son [of God] must be confessed to be in two natures, unconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly, inseparably [united], and that without the distinction of natures being taken away by such union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature being preserved and being united in one Person and subsistence, not separated or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten, God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, aas the Prophets of old time have spoken concerning him, and as the Lord Jesus Christ hath taught us, and as the Creed of the Fathers hath delivered to us."

Necessity and Divine Simplicity

2005-12-20T22:15:00.000-06:00

Johny-Dee provides an interesting criticism of the doctrine of Divine Simplicity here and here at Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Check it out.

Aquinas On Angelic Cognition

2005-12-15T22:17:00.000-06:00

While reading Freddoso on angels, I was reminded of Bultmann’s comment that “it is impossible to use electrical light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles.” By “impossible” Bultmann does not mean (I think) that it just is not epistemically possible to hold to be true the phenomena of miracles and to avail ourselves of modern technology. Rather, his point, I suspect, is that the modern age with all its marvelous advances has changed the way we see the world. We have “grown up,” he might say, having abandoned our medieval superstitions about angels and demons. Yet for those of us who use “electrical light and the wireless” but are not embarrassed by notion of angelic beings, Freddoso reminds us what a rich and fascinating resource Aquinas is. Commenting on what it is like to be an angel Freddoso says:

…even though you do not get your knowledge through sensation, you suddenly realize, upon closer in(tro)spection, that you’re really quite the expert in mathematics and natural science, without ever having taken any courses and without having devised any long proofs or carried out any experiments. In fact, your grasp of nature is as thorough as it was painless to acquire. You came by it naturally, as they say; you’ve had it ever since you popped into existence or, more accurately, ever since you were brought into existence.

What does he mean here? Just what do angels know, and how do they know it? Aquinas takes up the question in the Summa I. QQ 54-58. Now Aquinas readily follows Aristotle positing that although knowledge begins with sensory experience, there is more to knowing a thing that simply “seeing” it. Knowledge comes as we engage in the process of abstraction, the mental act of ‘stripping away’ all the inessential qualities of a thing. This is because the form (the ‘whatness’) of the particular must be grasped for there to be true knowledge. The rational mind comes to know particulars when it abstracts the form or the ‘intelligible species’ from that particular. What is left in the mind of the knower is simply the intelligible species of that thing, for the form of the particular must be in the mind of the knower for the thing to be known. It would seem then that angels, like humans, come to knowledge when they abstract the universal from some particular object so that the form of that object comes to reside in them. Aquinas himself raises the point:

It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things (I. Q.55. art.2).

The form of some individual is in the mind of a knower either as an exemplar (and therefore a [formal] cause of what is known) or as an image having been abstracted from the individual. Since the forms are not in the angel as an exemplar (i.e. it is not causal) as in case of God, then the forms must be acquired through abstraction. But Aquinas says this in fact is not the case:

An angel does not cognize individuals through an acquired form at all, because it does not cognize [anything] through a form it gets from a thing; for [if it did, then] in that case things would act on its intellect, which is impossible. Nor does it cognize [an individual] through some form newly infused by God, newly revealing something to the angel. For the forms an angel has in it, which were created along with it, are sufficient [for it] to cognize everything cognizable [by it] (Quaestiones Quodlibeales 7.1.3 ad 1).

Unlike a human being who comes to know an individual, say a book, by abstracting the universal or form from the book (the book having acted on his senses), an angel comes to knowledge of the same in virtue of the intelligible forms already in the angel from the time of its creation. So then, an angel can be said to know an individual not through that individual’s form, but through itself! An angel then, like Freddoso says, actually knows what it knows through introspection. Here is another matter to consider. Angelic cognition (in virtue of the very nature of such beings) is far more excellent than that of human beings. Eleonore Stump presses the point:

…like God and unlike human beings, angels are absolutely immaterial knowers. For that reason, angelic cognition, like divine cognition, is entirely intellective, surpassing human intellective cognition in the degree of universality and the fewness of the intelligible forms it needs in order to cognize things. (Stump, Aquinas).

She quotes Aquinas:

God understands all things through his one essence. But the higher intellective substances, although they do understand through more than one form, [in comparison with lower intellective substances] they understand through fewer and more universal forms, more powerful for comprehending things, because of the efficacy of the intellective power that is in them. In the lower [intellective substances], however, there are more forms, which are less universal and less efficacious for comprehending things, to which [these lower substances] fall short of the intellective power of the higher ones (Summa I. Q. 89).

A human being, say Socrates, in knowing any individual thing, must acquire the intelligible species of that thing in order to know it. So then for any object x, Socrates knows x only if Socrates has abstracted the form of x. But think of the multitude of objects that Socrates knows: rocks, rivers, hair, cats, dogs, houses, etc. Socrates knows each of these individuals only when he abstracts the forms of each. So Socrates knows a multitude of objects by means of multitudes of universals—rockness, riverness, hairness, catness, dogness, and so on. But Aquinas thinks that an intellectual substance, say, the angel Gabriel, has more excellent knowledge for he is able to know a multitude of things through fewer, higher universals, “more powerful for comprehending things.” And such forms are of course already built into Gabriel’s nature, having been instilled there at his creation. Stump provides us an analogy: A little boy is able to cognize his mother’s disposable coffee cup by applying to it the universal, cup. But a person of greater knowledge, say a chemist who knows the nature of Styrofoam or a physicist who has a firm grasp of the basic properties of matter, is able to have a deeper and fuller knowledge of the same cup. They of course know this disposable cup by means of the universal cup, but this universal is subsumed under other universals, which are in turn subsumed under other universals until we come to the highest universal available to the chemist or the physicist.

Philosophy of Religion Site

2005-12-13T22:34:00.000-06:00

I stumbled across this Philosophy of Religion site by pure accident. This guy is a friend of Keith and I and he heads up a philosophy discussion group that we attend.

Dembski On Plantinga On "Fundamentalism"

2005-12-08T12:51:00.000-06:00

Plantinga just has a way with words. See his brief treatise on Fundamentalism.

Aseity and Abstract Objects

2005-12-04T23:02:00.000-06:00

A good number of philosophers since Plato have thought that reality is not only comprised of corporeal and sensible objects, but that alongside the physical universe, there exists an invisible realm of abstract entities like properties, numbers, propositions, sets, and the like. Among other things, Platonism, seems to provide a unified account of predication so that for something like 1) Socrates is white, there is a subject, “Socrates,” and a real abstract entity, the property “whiteness,” distinct from and exemplified by Socrates. A subject has its properties either essentially or accidentally. The essential properties of a subject are called its essence or nature. Now theists have long confessed that a Perfect Being must be completely self-sufficient and depend upon nothing for its existence. This notion is often expressed in the statement, ‘God exists a se,’ that is, of Himself. Hence the aseity thesis: 2) Necessarily, God depends on nothing distinct from Himself for His existence. A problem seems to arise, however, when we think of God and abstract objects. If God has a nature, then how should we understand His properties? Take the property omniscience which God has essentially, how should we understand God’s relationship to this entity? Plantinga wonders,

If that property didn’t exist, then God wouldn’t have it, in which case he wouldn’t be omniscient. So the existence of omniscience is a necessary condition of God’s being the way he is; in this sense he seems to be dependent upon it (Plantinga, Does God Have A Nature?).

God it seems, must exist in an asymmetrical relation of dependency on His properties for while say, the property omniscience is a necessary condition for His existence, it does not seem that His existence is a necessary condition for the existence of omniscience. But what of the aseity thesis? If God is dependent on the property omniscience, then it seems that He does not exist a se after all. Should theists then reject the aseity thesis?

Boethian Eternalism, Fatalism, and Future Contingents

2005-12-03T00:34:00.000-06:00

OK, sorry I've been absent so long everyone. I was under the weather for a while and so was my wife so I just decided to take a break. Anyway, I promised Attilla that I would give the eternalist response to the problem of foreknowledge and fatalism. Here goes.

Here is how I think it might go. I will sketch the fatalism argument according to Linda Zagzebski as it makes clear some key assumptions (the Principle of the Necessity of the Past, the Transfer of Necessity Principle) in fatalist arguments. Let B = You will answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am. 1) Yesterday, God infallibly believed B (supposition of infallible knowledge) 2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then (Principle of the necessity of the past). 3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed B (from 1, 2) 4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed B, then B (definition of “infallibility”). 5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary (Transfer of Necessity Principle). 6) So it is now-necessary that B (3,4,5) 7) If it is now-necessary that B, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am (Definition of "necessary"). 8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am (6, 7) 9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely (Principle of Alternate Possibilities). 10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9am, you will not do it freely (8, 9, modus ponens). The Molinist response (see previous post) does not deny any of the premises in this argument. It simply argues that God’s knowledge is such that if B God would infallibly know that B and if –B, then God would have infallibly known –B. The eternalist however explicitly denies 1). It does not deny that God infallibly believes B, rather it denies that Yesterday, God infallibly believes B. God exists timelessly, and since God does not exist at any time, then He does not hold His beliefs at any time. As God does not exist temporally before events, He does not have fore-knowledge of events, rather God’s knowledge is such that He apprehends in a single complete and infallible grasp, all events in the entire span of time. God’s knowledge of my answering the phone at 9am then does not make my answering the phone at 9am any more necessary than my seeing Socrates sitting makes Socrates’ sitting necessary. If our cognizance of present things does not make those things necessary, why should it be thought that God’s cognizance of things eternally present to Him makes them necessary?

Molinism & the Argument for Theological Fatalism

2005-11-14T15:29:00.000-06:00

Arguments of a wide variety have traditionally been offered against Christian theism. We have chosen to treat the fatalist’s argument for at least two reasons: (1) it is one of the more common objections we have personally encountered, and (2) it has implications for several other topics that we intend to turn our attention upon soon. Regardless of whether you agree with our stance or not, we welcome your contributions to this discussion. Stated syllogistically, the argument goes thus: (1) If God knows all future events, then all my future choices are determined (2) If all my future choices are determined, then it does not matter what I do. (3) Therefore, if God knows all future events, then it does not matter what I do. So, if this argument were compelling, then it would seem that everything that happens does so necessarily, thus rendering us incapable of acting otherwise than we in fact do. This, of course, seems to excuse us from any genuine sense of responsibility for our actions, not to mention making passivity one’s only recourse in a life intended to be lived to its fullest. Now, this argument obviously does not logically preclude the existence of God; however, it does, if true, at least cast doubt upon our conception of God qua God. But, should we accept each premise? Not obviously so. As it happens, both (1) & (2) have been rejected. It will be sufficient for us to argue for the falsity of (1). Now, when we say we intend to reject (1), perhaps we should clarify: we accept the antecedent as true, the Bible teaches that God does indeed possess (omniscient) knowledge of future events. But what is it that compels the fatalist to think that God’s simply knowing that an event will occur necessarily entails that that event will occur? If I know that my wife will arise at 7:00 in the morning, is she now fated to arise at 7:00? Absolutely not! Why? Because we believe that she has the power to act otherwise (a feature of freedom in the libertarian sense). Hold on though, if she has the power to refrain from arising at 7:00 (and arise at say, noon), then doesn’t she have the power to bring it about that my (necessarily true) knowledge is false (which would be the power to actualize a contradiction—an impossibility)? No. It is important to bear in mind the distinction between believing something and knowing something. If I know that she will arise at 7:00, then she will arise at 7:00; if I merely believe that she will arise at 7:00, then maybe she will and maybe she won’t. If I know that she will arise at 7:00, it merely follows that she will arise then, not that she must. Therefore, she does have the power to bring it about that my true belief would have been false (she could have refrained from so acting); she will not refrain from so acting, though she could. Thus foreknowledge (knowing before hand) does not imply fatalism. Now, it is important that you understand this before proceeding, or this discussion will not benefit you much. Let’s take this reasoning to (1). We have seen that merely knowing does not demand fatalism, but the fatalist will object that we’re not talking about humans here, we’re talking about God. Unfortunately for the fatalist, adding God to the equation does not change things; the same reasoning and principles apply. Consider that God foreknows that I will arise at 7:00 tomorrow. I have the power to arise at 5:00 or noon, and if I were to do either then God would have foreknown that instead of my arising at 7:00. In other words (as Christian theologians have always insisted), the content of God’s foreknowledge is not necessary (that content could have been different). We hold that the reason God foreknows that I will arise at 7:00 is that I will in fact arise at 7:00; if I were to choose to arise at noon, then God would have foreknown that. I could refrain, but (in this actualized world) I simply will not. This, by the way, is the foundation for demonstrating the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. It seems the fatalist’s only recourse is to deny that God can know future free acts. [Unfortunately some Christian philosophers have been content to assert that God qua God believes so perfectly that he can be said to know such things; this is insufficient] It seems the objection is that even though we have seen foreknowledge and freedom to be compatible, that not even God can actually have such knowledge. Well, frankly the burden of proof is on the objector. Why is divine foreknowledge impossible? We welcome any response to this question for discussion. As finite humans contemplating the infinite God, we are in no good epistemic position to explain exactly how God can have such foreknowledge. Perhaps, though, there is a way. First, an elementary distinction: we must not confuse chronological priority with logical priority; logical priority has nothing to do with temporal priority. Though God’s foreknowledge of my free choices is chronologically prior to my making them (for example, it is true that 100 years ago God knew that I would write this), my making such choices is logically prior to God’s so knowing. Indeed, A could be logically prior to B, though they are temporally concurrent. Consider an argument: its premises are obviously not temporally true one before the other; each premise is true at the same time, though the premises are logically prior to the conclusion. It seems that the Molinist account of divine knowledge provides a compelling (if not startling) explanation of how God could know the future choices of free creatures. Simply put, this account divides God’s knowledge into three logical moments. First, God knows all necessary truths. Here we also find God’s knowledge of all possibilities, things such as all possible persons he could create, indeed here he knows each possible world he could choose to create. This we call natural knowledge. Stick with us here: in the third (logical) moment, God knows perfectly the world he has created, the actual world. This we call his free knowledge. Here we find his foreknowledge of all events and choices. As stated above, this knowledge is not necessary to Him; it is necessary that God have free knowledge, but since he could have chosen to create a different world than he in fact did, this knowledge could have been comprised by perfect knowledge of that (different) world. Finally, in the second moment, the Molinist posits middle knowledge. It is here that we find God’s knowledge of what every possible creature would do in any given set of circumstances (note that it is via his natural knowledge that God knows what any creature could do). This moment is logically prior to God’s decision to create (see below). Consider this simple illustration (modified from Craig’s chart, in The Only Wise God, p.131): Natural Knowledge Middle Knowledge ------- God’s decision to create some world ------- Free Knowledge By way of summarizing let’s return to our example from above. God eternally knows all the possible things I could choose to do if placed in certain circumstances, including whether I could arise at 7:00 or not tomorrow (via his natural knowledge). Now, God (via his middle knowledge) knows what I would in fact freely choose to do in said circumstances, for if he knows all that I could do in any circumstances, then, by virtue of his choosing which world to create (and thus, which circumstances I will find myself in), he knows whether I will in fact arise at 7:00 or not. Remember our discussion above, his mere knowing does not necessitate my so acting; I am absolutely free to do whatever I want in any set of circumstances. God chooses the circumstances to actualize (create), thus he knows what I will freely choose. Thus, God knows all future events and I am undetermined in what choices I make and the fatalist’s argument fails. This article is intentionally written with open ends; we have left room for many questions and much discussion. All comments, questions, and (especially) objections are welcome. “O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!” Romans 11:33. See, William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God, 1987 & Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 1974.

Molinism: Part I

2005-11-12T00:00:00.000-06:00

Ok, well, all you guys are already hounding me about Molinism so I guess I might as well bring up this elephant in the room. One preliminary. As far as I know, there are five major views on God, foreknowledge, and free will. I'm sure there are several variations of each: 1. Calvinistic Compatibilism--God foreknows all events because He has foreordained them. 2. Simple Foreknowledge--God simply knows all future events including those resulting from the actions and choices of free creatures. We do not know the basis for this knowledge. 3. Boethian Eternalism--God, since He exists outside of time, sees all temporal events as if they were laid out before Him. 4. Open Theism--the future exists partly in terms of possibilities rather than certainties. God has knowledge of such future certainties such as those acts that He will do. However, God cannot know those future decisions or acts of free creatures since these exists only as possibilities 5. Molinism--well, we'll get to that. Am I right here?

Atemporalism & the Argument from Simultaneity

2005-11-10T13:03:00.000-06:00

One often repeated argument against atemporalism is the argument from simultaneity (hereafter "AS"). For the life of me, I cannot figure why this argument persists even though there are much better arguments against atemporalism available (e.g. the argument from God’s knowledge of tensed propositions, or the argument from temporal becoming). Swinburne and Kenny’s formulations of the argument are usually taken as standard. According to Anthony Kenny (“Aquinas on Divine Foreknowledge & Human Freedom” in Reason and Religion, 1987):

Indeed, the whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically incoherent. For simultaneity as ordinarily understood is a transitive relation. If A happens at the same time as B and B happens at the same time as C, then A happens at the same time as C. If the BBC programme and the ITV programme both start when Big Ben strikes ten, then they both start at the same time. But, on [the atemporalist’s] view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Again, on this view, the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on.

So according to AS, 1) If atemporalism is true, then eternity is simultaneous with every event in history. 2) If eternity is simultaneous with every event in history, then by transitivity, every event in history is simultaneous with every other event in history. 3) But every event in history is not simultaneous with every other event in history. 4) Therefore atemporalism is false. Now this argument is valid. 2) simply appeals to the principle of transitivity, and 3) is evidently true. 4) follows by modus tollens. If atemporalism results in the notion that the burning of Rome is simultaneous with the Kenny’s writing, then atemporalism is to be rejected. But AS has not shown this to be the case: 1) is plainly false, for according to atemporalism, God exists, but He does not exist at any time. Hence eternity is not simultaneous with every event in history; indeed eternity is not simultaneous with any event in history. So then, when Aquinas uses the language of simultaneity to discuss the relation between time and eternity, he is only doing so analogically and not literally. The latter is required to make argument work, but unfortunately for AS it turns out, this is the very thing makes the first premise false.

Dennett's Lexicon

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This is a must-have for aspiring philosophers. Daniel Dennett has compiled a satirical Philosophical Lexicon (see here) of key terms that every student of philosophy simply must know. Here are some samples: chisholm, v. To make repeated small alterations in a definition or example. "He started with definition (d.8) and kept chisholming away at it until he ended up with (d.8'''''''')." foucault, n. A howler, an insane mistake. "I'm afraid I've committed an egregious foucault." getty, adj. Describing a counterexample that obtains its conclusion. "Your first rule raises some interesting questions, but your second is gettier." I loved this one: hume, pron. (1) Indefinite personal and relative pronoun, presupposing no referent. Useful esp. in writing solipsistic treatises, sc. "to hume it may concern." v. (2) To commit to the flames, bury, or otherwise destroy a philosophical position, as in "That theory was humed in the 1920s." Hence, exhume, v. to revive a position generally believed to humed. I couldn't stop laughing after reading these two: kripke, adj. Not understood, but considered brilliant. "I hate to admit it, but I found his remarks quite kripke." kripkography, n. The opposite of cryptography: the art of translating a meaningless message (about, e.g., de re necessity) into expressions that an uninitiated observer would take to be straightforwardly meaningful (e.g., "Look, it's not so hard. All he's saying is that since the term is a rigid designator, it refers to the same thing in all possible worlds"). "He used to claim he just 'couldn't understand' essentialism, but now, thanks to kripkography, he just sits there nodding and smiling." planting, v. To use twentieth-century fertilizer to encourage new shoots from eleventh -century ideas which everyone thought had gone to seed; hence, plantinger, n. one who plantings. quine, v. (1) To deny resolutely the existence of importance of something real or significant. "Some philosophers have quined classes, and some have even quined physical objects." Occasionally used intr., e.g., "You think I quine, sir. I assure you I do not!" (2) n. The total aggregate sensory surface of the world; hence quinitis, irritation of the quine.

A Review of "Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up? A Debate between William Lane Craig & John Dominic Crossan"

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written by Keith Loftin. originally published in the Areopagus Journal 5/4 (July-August 2005): 30-31. reprinted with permission from Areopagus Journal. Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up? Edited by Paul Copan. IVP, 1998; 179 pages. Is the Jesus who walked the streets of Nazareth the same Jesus, the Christ, to whom the New Testament Gospels attribute miracles and divinity? Can Christians legitimately claim that these men are in fact one and the same? In short, who is the “real Jesus?” Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up is one of few attempts at dialogue between evangelicals and liberals about the historical Jesus. Eminent theologian and philosopher William Lane Craig represents the evangelical camp, while John Dominic Crossan, a prominent member of the Jesus Seminar and professor of biblical studies at DePaul University, represents the latter perspective. As many conservative scholars have observed, “Jesus of Nazareth is under fire.” The belief that the person Jesus of Nazareth is one and the same with Jesus the Christ, the Son of the Living God, has suffered sustained attack in the last two centuries. Perhaps it has been popularized more in the past ten or fifteen years by its appearances in the general media (most recently so in ABC 20/20’s piece, The Resurrection: Searching for Answers, which aired Sunday, May 22, 2005, which can be accessed by visiting www.abcnews.com). This prolonged debate over Jesus’ deity has recently gained widespread attention, primarily due to the efforts of the Jesus Seminar, an annual gathering of liberal scholars who are “organized to renew the quest of the historical Jesus.” Commonly labeled “the quest for the historical Jesus,” this investigation of Jesus’ life began in the late 1700’s with scholars who thought it necessary to distinguish between theological dogma and historically demonstrated facts. Their philosophical assumptions led them to seek exclusively natural explanations for Jesus’ actions and claims. This naturalist predisposition also shapes the Jesus Seminar’s research and is evident in Crossan’s contribution to the book (p. 30). While he denies the charge, his assertion that “the supernatural always…operates through the screen of the natural (p. 45),” belies his dissent. Scholars involved in the “Second Quest”(launched in the nineteenth century) argued that the portrait of Christ accepted by Christianity was almost entirely mythological, an allegation repeated by scholars of the Jesus Seminar. From the beginning doubt has been cast upon the reliability of the Gospels’ portrayal of his life (for response see Blomberg’s, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, IVP, 1987). Naturalist presuppositions are evident here as well and shape their analysis of the Gospels, as evidenced by Crossan’s defining such references to Jesus as the “Lamb of God” as “symbolic…figurative…metaphorical” (p. 35). Craig argues that the Gospels contain literal events; there is no need for “recourse to a misleading metaphor like the resurrection” (p. 42). The New Quest, which is the final generally recognized quest, was concerned with methodology. Scholars involved in this quest (rightly) seek to identify Jesus within his first-century, Jewish milieu. The early New Quest sought to discern Jesus from the myth of the early Church. These scholars assumed that the early Church heavily embellished the Gospels. Though Crossan and the Jesus Seminar employ a “Second Quest” approach, they do resemble the early New Quest insomuch as they endorse an inventive view of the early Christian community (see esp. footnotes on p. 30). Craig denies such a view and argues that the Gospels’ claims are real historical facts. If approached objectively, the Gospels will be believed innocent until proven guilty, rather than vice versa as the Jesus Seminar would have it. As the book demonstrates, the debate is not exclusively a textual one. Discussions about the historical Jesus also include philosophical and theological arguments. Craig argues Jesus’ deity from the validity of the resurrection (p. 26). Surely if there are good reasons to believe that the physical resurrection occurred, then we will consequently have good reasons to believe that Jesus Christ was who He claimed to be (p. 57). (As Paul argued in 1 Corinthians 15:14, Christian faith is vain apart from the resurrection, which is one of Craig’s main points.) All four Gospels attest to the empty tomb. Either as Crossan asserts, such accounts are metaphorical (p. 53ff) and “empty tombs don’t prove anything (p. 98),” or they are as Craig affirms: actual, physical facts supporting the evangelical position (p. 101). Craig further argues that there are several well-attested accounts of Jesus appearing publicly to people after His resurrection (p. 28). These accounts would stand, he maintains, even when weighed on the Jesus Seminar’s scales (p. 55). Crossan and Craig provide ample bibliographic material to satisfy the involved reader. Following the dialog between Craig and Crossan, four experts offer their reflections on the debate. Robert Miller and Marcus Borg represent the Jesus Seminar, while Craig Blomberg and Ben Witherington III offer evangelical responses. Following the four responsive articles, the debaters each answer the various critiques offered against them. Will the Real Jesus Please Stand Up offers an informative and well-written account of the historical and contemporary quest for the historical Jesus. While it provides scholarly historical, philosophical, and theological arguments, this book can be read with profit by non-scholars.

Welcome

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Welcome one and all to Summa Philosophiae, a blog dedicated to questions of philosophy and theology. My friend Keith and I, after countless hours of discussions over coffee, decided to take our disputations online. So much to learn, so little time. Hope you join in!